I. Expectations of Constitutive, Not Instrumental, Rehnquist Court Decision-Making I present evidence from Rehnquist Court First Amendment speech and religion cases from the 1990s to the present. I ask whether these cases of the mature Rehnquist Court support the thesis that the Supreme Court continues to be constitutive in its decision-making and innovative in doctrine as it meets the demands of our more complex and diverse society. I conclude the essay with some thoughts as to why the First Amendment jurisprudence of the mature Rehnquist Court is far more muted than its cases involving privacy, abortion choice, and homosexual rights, and I suggest what we can expect from the Supreme Court in the future.
It was not until the 1991-1992 term that it was possible to begin to decipher the direction that doctrine would take in the Rehnquist Court because it takes a few years for the justices' visions of polity and rights principles -and their application to constitutional questions -to coalesce. It was not until the 1991-1992 term that we have what I will call the mature Rehnquist Court, a Court that consisted of a majority of members representing a new era in American Politics, a post-New Deal era in which a majority of justices were selected by conservative Republican Presidents who began to question many of the assumptions about whether we should have faith in government as compared to economic and social markets as venues of political change.
The landmark decisions of the 1991-92 term of the Supreme Court included cases in which the mature Rehnquist Court did not turn its back on precedent or on the tests and principles that had been developed by the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) and Warren Burger (1969 Burger ( -1986 . 1 Evidence from the landmark cases of the 1991-92 term of the Rehnquist Court support the view that it was "constitutive," not simply "instrumental" in its decision-making, as had been the Supreme Court under Chief Justices Warren and Burger.
The basic tenets of the constitutive approach are the following: 1) the Supreme Court does not make its choices instrumentally -that is, it does not choose an outcome and then simply use polity and rights principles to support that outcome; 2) the Supreme Court does not decide cases in ways that are similar to those used by legislative or bureaucratic policy-makers; instead, there is a "constitutive" decision-making process in which members of the Supreme Court engage in a textured and sincere debate about which polity and rights principles are applicable to a case and how to apply them; 3) the Supreme Court is aware of new ideas, scholarship, and methods of problem definition created by the interpretive community, and over time it incorporates these into its decisions; 4) polity principles, such as when to follow precedent, when to trust elected bodies or courts, and when to trust different levels and branches of government to make constitutionally important decisions are as important to Rehnquist Court decision-making in these 1991-92 landmark cases as they were in the Warren and Burger Court eras; and 5) the Rehnquist Court, now dominated by Reagan-Bush appointees, like the Court in previous eras, finds justices protecting their autonomy, and that of the Supreme Court as an institution, from the influence of the President, the majority coalition, and politics directly. 2 If justices on the Rehnquist Court are simply instrumental in their decision-making, that is, if they simply follow election returns or their own policy wants or those of the president/ majority coalition that appointed them, and use principles simply to support predetermined policy wants, what might we expect from the Rehnquist Court, which consists of so many members who were selected by conservative Republican presidents? We would expect the Rehnquist Court to reject long-held polity and rights principles and precedents from the Warren and Burger Court eras. Moreover, we would expect few additions to the rights of individuals generally and, most importantly, few additions to the rights of what I will call subordinated groupswomen, homosexuals, and minority races, or perhaps a significant reduction in the rights of members of such groups. We should also expect the Supreme Court to overturn Supreme Court decisions that the presidents and majority coalitions which appointed the members of the Rehnquist Court have opposed in such a public and determined way.
If, however, the mature Rehnquist Court follows the constitutive approach, not election returns, and is not simply instrumental in its approach, we would expect it to define new individual rights, to be counter-majoritarian when fundamental polity and rights principles are about to be undermined, and to innovate as they define individual rights and the powers of government.
II. Major Rehnquist Court Religion Decisions
Since 1990
A. The State Shall Not Establish Religion
If the Rehnquist Court were instrumental in its decision-making on Establishment Clause cases, one would expect this Court era, dominated by Reagan-Bush appointees, to take a very strong stand to reduce the separation of church and state, because of the expanded role of the Christian right in the majority coalition of the Reagan-Bush Republican party. 3 However, if the mature Rehnquist Court is following a constitutive decision-making process in Establishment Clause cases, we would expect it to follow precedents such as the Lemon test when it decides cases on the establishment of religion by government. The Lemon test requires that for a law or government policy to be upheld it must 1) have a secular purpose, 2) have a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and 3) not foster excessive entanglement with religion. 4 The Lemon test has polity principles within it, such as no excessive entanglement by government in religion, as well as concerns about state neutrality to religion and support of the right of individuals to engage in religious speech and action. We would also expect the Court to support the free exercise of religion for minority religions which are not part of the Republican Party's majority coalition. Finally, we would expect the Court to seek greater neutrality in its principles, so it can provide direction to and respect for diverse religions and for the non-religious in our nation. We would also expect that the quest for neutrality would be difficult, if not impossible to meet.
An analysis of free exercise and establishment clause cases in the 1990's finds that the mature Rehnquist Court continues to use Lemon test principles to continue a regime of the separation of church and state. In the area of freedom of religion, the mature Rehnquist Court is clearly following a constitutive approach to its decision-making and remains adamant that the Supreme Court sustain the separation of church and state in the future.
Religious Speech in Public Squares
In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Pittsburgh Chapter (1989), the Rehnquist Court turned its back on some premises which were very accommodating to religious speech in public squares in Lynch v. Donnelly (1984), a Burger Court case. In Allegheny, the Rehnquist Court finds that the Lemon test cannot support a crèche display in a setting that fails sufficiently to detract from its religious message. The Rehnquist Court sets the standard of review at strict scrutiny of religious displays on public land, which might be demonstrating a government's allegiance to a particular sect or creed.
The Court allows the Jewish symbol of a Menorah to be displayed, given that its setting next to a Christmas tree undercuts the view that government seeks to endorse a particular religion. It is significant that all of the justices rely more firmly on the Lemon test than in the Lynch case.
In Mergens (1990) , the Rehnquist Court supports the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act, passed by Congress in 1984. This law required that a public secondary school which creates a "limited public forum" that is open to student clubs cannot discriminate against student clubs whose meetings are based on "religious, political, philosophical or other content of the speech at such meetings." 5 The Court found that Congress's extension of the Widmar decision to public schools was constitutional. Once a limited public forum is opened for such clubs, schools cannot deny access to religious groups. Again the Lemon test was used in this case.
In Lamb's Chapel v. Union Free School District (1993), the Rehnquist Court declared unconstitutional a New York state law which authorizes local school boards to adopt reasonable regulations that permit after-school use of school property for many purposes, but refused to allow meetings for religious purposes.
To not allow religious meetings is unconstitutional, contentbased viewpoint discrimination. Again, the mature Rehnquist Court relies on the Lemon test to find that a showing of a religious film after school hours in a meeting open to the public without school personnel involvement should not be viewed as an endorsement of religion.
In these cases, the mature Rehnquist Court is allowing the use of limited public forums for religious speech when they are open for political speech as long as government or school officials are not actively participating in such forums and the forums are open enough that religious speech is only one of many different ideas that are allowed in the public forum.
Prayers in Public School Classrooms and Assemblies
In Lee v. Weisman (1992), the Rehnquist Court outlaws prayers at a middle school graduation. Most importantly, the mature Rehnquist Court renews its faith in the principles of the Lemon test. Weisman demonstrates that a majority of the Rehnquist Court continues to support polity-based principles in the Lemon test, of no entanglement between church and state and no state endorsement of religion, plus a concern about the political divisiveness that would result should the state endorse religion. 6 Most importantly, in Weisman and many of the cases discussed in this essay, the mature Rehnquist Court rejects the call by scholars who seek to undermine Lemon test polity principles that call for the institutional separation of church and state. Scholars unsuccessfully sought to base Establishment Clause principles on the premise that citizens simply must be free from government coercion when they engage in religious activities. In supporting the no-entanglement, no political divisiveness, and no religious endorsement principles of the Lemon test, the separation of church and state remains on a strong footing, while minority religions continue to have access to limited public forums when other religions and political speakers have access. 7
Carving Out Separate School Districts Based on Religion
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet (1994) , the Rehnquist Court refused to allow New York to carve out a separate school district for children living in the Village of Kiryas Joel, a religious enclave of the Satmar Hasidim sect of Judaism. This school district was to provide services for handicapped children and health services for students who attended private schools. Prior to this action, Kiryas (1993), we see the mature Rehnquist Court trying to establish principles which will accommodate religious acts while not undermining laws which are in place to protect important government interests.
In Smith, the Rehnquist Court decided that the Free Exercise Clause permits the state to prohibit sacramental use of peyote, a controlled substance, and therefore could deny unemployment benefits for an individual dismissed from a job for religious use of peyote. Justice Scalia wrote a majority opinion which emphasized that when the law is of general applicability, is passed with non-religious intent, and does not target only religious practices, it may be applied against citizens whose motivation for breaking the law is religious.
However, only three other justices supported the test favored by Scalia. O'Connor, writing a concurrence, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, argues that the Court must balance religious concerns with generally applicable regulations. Although O'Connor opposed Scalia's test, the application of her test resulted in her support of the constitutionality of this state law.
In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (1993), a majority of the Rehnquist Court formally rejects Scalia's test. In moving away from the Smith case rule (that a law that is simply neutral in intent and general in application is enough to allow government to limit the free exercise of a religious practice), in Hialeah the Court found that the city's antianimal sacrifice law had been gerrymandered to proscribe the religious killings of animals by Santeria church members, while permitting similar killing of animals in secular situations. The Court finds the law, as applied to the sacrifice of animals for religious purposes, is over and underinclusive with regard to animal killings for food, eradication of insects, and the euthanasia of excess animals. Moreover, the regulations suppressed far more religious conduct than was needed to meet the valid public health concerns of the law.
Souter, in concurrence, writes a critique of the Smith rule which acknowledges that there has been a modification of the Smith rule in this case. He argues that the Smith rule is of limited use as precedent because it is too statute-specific in terms of the interest stated by the state for the law and is not solicitous of the needs of our nation to balance state interests with support for the free exercise of religion. Blackmun, joined by O'Connor, agrees with Souter that "the First Amendment's protection of religion extends beyond those rare occasions on which the government explicitly targets religion" 10 The Rehnquist Court could have followed election returns and turned its back on key polity principles in Establishment Clause cases. They chose not to do so. Moreover, the Rehnquist Court has been supportive of free exercise rights even when government interests can be articulated as a basis to limit such rights. The Supreme Court with a clear majority of appointees by conservative Republican presidents chose not to do so. Rather, the mature Rehnquist Court chose to follow precedent and build doctrine upon principles developed during the Warren and Burger Court years, and to trust federal courts, not legislatures, to protect citizen rights under the religion clauses of the First Amendment.
III. Major Rehnquist Court Freedom of Political Speech and Action Decisions Since 1990
We see a similar story with regard to political speech under the First Amendment. Perhaps in no other area of constitutional law do we see the Rehnquist Court meeting the needs of a more complex and diverse nation than through doctrinal innovations in the area of freedom of expression. The mature Rehnquist Court has made important and principled First Amendment innovations which could not have been predicted by assuming that the Supreme Court is instrumental in its decision-making and follows election returns.
More specifically, the Rehnquist Court has led the way in making content neutrality a key principle in protecting the freedom of expression. The Rehnquist Court has gone far to protect expressive action as well as speech. We see this most dramatically in the flag-burning, hate speech, and abortion clinic cases.
A. Flag Burning as Expressive Action
In Texas v. Johnson (1989) 11 This Court also rejects the argument that flag burning is automatically to be viewed as "fighting words." There are no per se fighting words; a state cannot define such words without violating the First Amendment principle that the state must be content neutral when it limits speech and expressive action. Most importantly, as in all First Amendment cases, a majority of the Rehnquist Court supports the institutional norm that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution. In concurrence, Justice Kennedy writes, We cannot here ask another Branch to share responsibility as when the argument is made that a statute is flawed or incomplete. For we are presented here with a clear and simple statute to be judged against a pure command of the Constitution. The outcome cannot be laid at no doors but ours. The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result," 12
B. Hate Speech and Action
We see a similar situation in the mature Rehnquist Court's view of government regulation of hate speech. The Court refuses to allow a citizen's guilt or innocence to rest on the content of speech. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992), the Rehnquist Court found St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance to be unconstitutional. The ordinance stated, Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 13 The majority opinion was written by Justice Scalia, and joined by Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. All justices on the Court said this law violated the First Amendment. Because this law permits displays containing "fighting words" to be used by those in favor of racial and gender tolerance and equality, but not those against such tolerance, the ordinance is based on viewpoint discrimination, and is thus a violation of First Amendment principles. The state cannot selectively silence speech on the basis of content.
As in the Texas v. Johnson (1989) , the flag burning decision, it is the non-speech elements of fighting words, not the specific fighting words themselves, which make them illegal. The state may not create content-based subgroups of words which constitute fighting words or allow fighting words by some groups and not others. Also, this law would allow insults and abusive invectives, no matter how vicious and severe, to express hostility on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality, but not allow such invectives on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender. The law was rejected because it focused too much on content, rather than the non-speech elements of fighting words, which are the basis of threats against individuals and lead to a breach of peace in the community. 14 With regard to hate crimes cases, we again find the Rehnquist Court trying to establish First Amendment principles that allow offensive political speech, while not allowing conduct which will lead to a breach of peace or muzzle the weak in society. The Court is also concerned that with a more diverse society there is a greater chance that expression and expressive conduct will be viewed as offensive. Thus, government must ensure that First Amendment speech is protected for all, not only those with viewpoints which are shared by political leaders and a majority of the population.
C. Picketing at Abortion Clinics
In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic (1993), the Rehnquist Court refused to allow 42 U. S. C. Section 1985(3), a law which prohibits conspiracies that deprive any person or class of persons the equal protection of the laws, to be used to enforce trespass laws against individuals and groups who seek to close down abortion clinics. The Court found that opposition to abortion does not qualify alongside race discrimination as an "otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [underlying] the conspirators' action," that is required to prove a private conspiracy in violation of Section 1985. The Court decided that since there are reasons to oppose abortion other than one's sex or a derogatory view of women, this situation is unlike those in which conspiracies are based on race or gender. Opposition to abortion is not simply a sex-based intent nor does the fact that only women seek abortions make actions in opposition to abortion sex-based.
Justice Stevens, in dissent, viewed this law as protecting citizens from the theft of their constitutional right to privacy and abortion choice by organized and violent mobs. Also, the dissenters viewed Operation Rescue activities as part of a nationwide conspiracy that hinders and prevents adequate protection of citizens by constituted authorities. Stevens rejects federalism concerns and fears of undercutting First Amendment rights of assembly, as reasons to oppose the law. Stevens also views the law as protecting against invidious discrimination against women, even if it is animated by motives other than simply gender discrimination.
The case of Madsen v. Women's Health Center (1994) is a superb example of the Court trying to wrestle with some of the problems that it could not resolve in Bray. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Blackmun, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg (and joined by Stevens in parts), the Rehnquist Court allows a Florida Court to issue an injunction that prohibits anti-abortion protesters from demonstrating in specific places outside an abortion clinic. The Court allows a more stringent injunction here because there is a history of actual and threatened violation of law by Operation Rescue. A more tailored injunction other than one based on general time, place, and manner rules is allowed by the Court when it must protect women's rights to medical services, ensure public safety and the free flow of traffic, protect property rights, and preserve residential privacy.
However, the Rehnquist Court prohibited a 36 foot buffer zone as applied to private property north and west of the abortion clinic, since such a zone would burden speech; patients and staff have no need to go in these areas to gain a clear entrance and exit from the clinic. Nor can the state court place a blanket ban on "images observable" from the clinic: individuals in the clinic could also pull the curtains. Finally, a 300 foot no approach zone completely around the clinic -and its accompanying consent requirement to be in that zone -burdens more speech than is necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the clinic.
The significance of this decision is that the mature Rehnquist Court allowed the Florida judge to change the injunction based on the past actions of the protesters and the prior content of their signs. In previous First Amendment cases the Rehnquist Court made content neutrality a key component when government seeks limits on political and religious speech. 15 Here, the Court shies away from strict content neutrality in taking into account past actions of Operation Rescue, in allowing a more restrictive injunction.
The Rehnquist Court views an injunction differently than a generally applicable statute, whose constitutionality is to be assessed under traditional time, place, and manner regulations which are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. An injunction requires a close fit, not just with general First Amendment principles, but with the government's interest in order at the site of the area which the injunction covers. Rehnquist writes, "Accordingly, when evaluating a content-neutral injunction, we think that our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous. We must ask instead whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than is necessary to serve a significant government interest." 16 In Hill v. Colorado (2000) , the majority continues the Madsen approach which limits access to protesters near anti-abortion clinics, to the chagrin of originalist Justice Scalia. He views the limitation as content-based because similar limits are not placed on individuals who want to speak to persons about issues other than abortion choice.
What we see in the abortion demonstration cases, as well as in the religion and freedom of expression cases, is the mature Rehnquist Court in a position of flux on the major constitutional questions of the day, as new members seek consistency in the way to view cases. In the abortion demonstration cases, it is quite clear that we have not heard the last word on these issues from Justices Kennedy and Souter. Many of the Reagan-Bush appointees are not simply saying that since the Republican administrations have placed them on the Court, they will favor localism and state power rather than federal statutes and federal court support of state court injunctions to protect the rights of citizens who seek to protect their constitutional rights. Nor are the Reagan-Bush appointees taking stands that will make it impossible for them to deal with complex rights issues in the future in a way that is consistent with their polity and rights principles.
Because questions of individual rights are not as clear-cut as they were in the days of formal race and gender discrimination in the Warren and Burger Court eras, it may take the Rehnquist Court more time to define new rights. For example, in Bray, it is not clear whether the situation near abortion clinics raises questions of gender discrimination or some other rights violation, such as the liberty rights of those who seek an abortion, or whether it is viewed simply in a First Amendment context. It is also not clear how the protection of classes of citizens denied equal protection of the laws are to be balanced against polity principles, such as deference to state law enforcement and a fear of a national police force as a future force for tyranny in our nation. 17 IV. First Amendment and Privacy, Abortion Choice, and Homosexual Rights Cases Compared
First Amendment speech and religion cases are different from mature Rehnquist Court cases in substantive due process cases involving privacy, abortion choice, and homosexual rights. First Amendment speech and religion cases show a far less robust social construction process by the Supreme Court. This difference is not due to external politics because the dominant regime in Washington is the same with regard to both doctrinal issues in this period of cultural conservatism. The dissimilarity is due to the fact that Court norms and precedents under the First Amendment are more absolutist compared to the principles and past Court decision-making under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, decisions which encourage a more robust social construction process if the Court is to both follow and build upon precedents.
Because of the historical primacy of absolutism in First Amendment doctrine and theory, the mature Rehnquist Court engages in a muted social construction process when it decides such cases. This results in less clear-cut conceptions of what constitute liberal and conservative positions in First Amendment cases than in equal protection cases, and cases involving the right of privacy under the Due Process Clauses. Moreover, there are far fewer opportunities for justices to debate the validity of implied fundamental rights under the First Amendment. The absolutism which results in a more muted social construction process in First Amendment cases also leads to Court minimalism with regard to deciding cases involving government regulation of the Internet. The Court feared that the government would prematurely prescribe regulations that would undermine First Amendment speech principles, when such principles respecting a diverse range of speakers and listeners could be best protected in the near future by technical innovations.
There is far less judicial minimalism and a more robust social construction process in substantive due process and equal protection cases. This is evident in Romer v. Evans (1996) , and even more so in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) , the case on homosexual rights which eviscerated Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) . 18 The greater differences among the justices in these cases are due to fundamental differences between originalists and non-originalists as to how to interpret the Constitution, with particular regard to the legitimacy of the Court socially constructing the world outside as it defines fundamental rights. In this regard, the differences between originalists and non-originalists are far greater than those among liberal, moderate, and conservative non-originalists. Problems of constitutional theory and practice today include intractable equal protection questions, such as affirmative action and what constitutes race discrimination in the make-up of congressional districts. On First Amendment speech theory and practice we ask what principles will protect citizens from hate crimes while also fostering robust speech and expressive actions. These constitutional questions test the limits of constitutional theories, many of which were developed in the age when our nation sought to end the domination of blacks by whites and discrimination against women. Because we may lack today the constitutional theories to handle these issues and the even more complex constitutional questions that will arise in the future in our multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, and multi-religion nation, we should not expect the Rehnquist Court, or any future Court era, to come up with quick answers and simple controlling principles. However, the Supreme Court must come up with answers to these enduring constitutional questions, because the political system cannot be trusted to do so, nor is it entrusted to do so by our Constitution and constitutional practice.
If polity-based constitutional theory is chosen to meet the constitutional questions of the future, how is it to define structural inequalities in the political system when diversity is the rule, and simple concepts supporting pluralist government, as seen in John Hart Ely's work, are already anachronistic? 19 Does the presence of a more diverse citizenry mean we should trust government to decide speech regulations because no one group is dominant? Does a diverse citizenry mean that Federalist 10 problems, such as the tyranny of the majority in small constituencies, no longer face our nation? Or does the race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and ethnic separation in our nation require more searching constitutional principles to protect our citizens? Does the cumulative nature of race, gender, and class inequalities mean we have to rethink the liberal theoretical base of constitutional theory and law? Can we afford to revert back to long-standing liberal principles, such as the strict separation of public and private space, and expect to be able to settle the constitutional problems that face our nation today and will face it in the future?
No matter which presidents and majority coalitions select the Supreme Court justices in the future, and no matter what direction that constitutional theory and practice take, we can expect that the Supreme Court will continue to be constitutive in its decision-making. A major concern is whether political scientists have the methods, will, and imagination to meet the urgent need for more complex definitions of political system malfunctions, which will be central as bases for the definition, justification, and legitimacy of expanded individual rights for the citizens of our diverse nation. 20 At the core of this effort will be our ability to explain differences in the social construction process among doctrinal areas, and interpret these differences. For example, explaining why the social construction process is more robust in the mature Rehnquist Court in the doctrinal areas of substantive due process and equal protection as compared to First Amendment cases will tell us much about the effects of internal Court decision-making factors, such as differences among justices as to the polity and rights principles and the legitimacy of contrasting interpretive frameworks between originalists and non-originalists. It also will help us explain the process through which the Supreme Court brings the outside social, economic, and political world into its decision-making. 21 What can be expected from the Supreme Court in the future? 1) Constitutional questions, especially those which relate to the rights of subordinated groups, which are based on race, gender, immigrant status, national origin, or religion, will be far more complex and difficult to decide than in the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court eras. Unlike the question of racial equality on the Warren Court and gender equality on the Burger Court, there are fewer situations today in which citizens are formally denied equal protection of laws and access to the political system.
2) The complexity of constitutional issues will result in the Rehnquist Court and future Courts responding to calls for individual rights with more answers of "no" than in prior Court eras, while taking longer periods of time to provide a yes to calls for new rights; also rights principles will be far more measured and less ringing in tone than those defined in prior Court eras. 3) If the Rehnquist Court and future Courts, like the Court eras before it, will respond positively to new calls for rights, they will have to develop far more complex visions of polity malfunctions and denial of individual rights to justify the need for new individual rights and legitimate them, as has been confirmed in homosexual rights cases, such as Romer v. Evans (1996) , and recently in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) .
The Rehnquist Court, and future Courts, will respond positively to new calls for rights for the following reasons: 1) there is a fundamental respect, and need for, the Supreme Court to continue to be counter-majoritarian when rights and polity principles are violated; 2) the interpretive community will pressure the Supreme Court to develop new rights and new polity principles that will be based on more complex concepts of justice and more complex visions of political system malfunction, respectively; 3) most lawyers (and judges) are socialized into viewing the Constitution and long-held legal precedents as representing fundamental rights and polity principles for our nation, whose protection requires the Court at key moments to be countermajoritarian; and 4) the Court must support fundamental constitutional principles and the precedents developed under them, such as First Amendment rights to speech and religious freedom, equal protection of the law, due process, separation of powers, and federalism, while not simply being beholden to precedent, in order to meet the severe test of providing constitutional law for a more diverse nation.
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